62.6% of Social Engineering Prompts Triggered Unauthorized Payment Requests Across All 14 Models

Found first: a primary source the press has not covered yet.

A new benchmark paper tests whether AI payment agents can be socially engineered into issuing unauthorized transfers, and finds they can: 62.6% of adversarial prompts caused all 14 models tested to generate an unauthorized payment request. Adding a deterministic authorization check reduced unauthorized transfers to zero. The paper is APort Vault, authored by Uchi Uchibeke.

What the source says

The study replayed 4,371 human-written attacks from a live Capture the Flag competition across 14 models from 8 labs at five policy levels, yielding 225,964 total evaluations, all publicly released. At Level 4, the authorization-boundary attack category, model-alone payment request rates ranged from 71.2% to 84.3% across the 14 models, with an overall rate of 79.4%. Of the 1,293 Level 4 prompts, 62.6% caused all 14 models to generate a payment request. A deterministic pre-action check called Open Agent Passport (OAP) produced zero unauthorized transfers in 69,297 attempts, against 140 in 76,842 comparable attempts without it.

Why it matters

The cross-model figure is the most significant number. 62.6% of prompts in the adversarial set succeeded against every model tested, meaning an attacker does not need to tailor exploits by provider. A deterministic authorization specification eliminated unauthorized transfers entirely. No model in the test achieved this on its own.