anthropic.com web signal

Anthropic: Zhipu's GLM-5.3 Matches Claude on Autonomous Exploits

5 sources tracking this story

TL;DR

  • NIST/CAISI rated GLM-5.3 the most cyber-capable open-weight model on September 17, twelve days before Anthropic published its own red-team findings, providing independent multi-agency validation.
  • GLM-5.3 scored 50 working exploits on ExploitBench versus Claude Mythos Preview's 56, confirming functional near-parity at autonomous end-to-end exploit construction.
  • Abliteration drops GLM-5.3 refusal rates from above 90% to between 2% and 12% with negligible capability loss, and stripped weights are already circulating freely online.

Anthropic reports Tuesday that Zhipu AI's GLM-5.3 develops end-to-end exploits in 50 of 410 attempts on ExploitBench, matching Claude Mythos Preview's 56 successes, and achieves "full control flow hijacks in 4% of the trials" on the company's internal Binary Exploitation benchmark, versus 6% for Mythos.

The model is released as open-weight.

Parity matters because GLM-5.3's built-in refusals do not survive contact with adversaries. Anthropic's researchers report harmful-request engagement at 64% under deceptive prompts, 92% with prefilled reasoning, and 100% after abliteration, the technique of stripping refusal behavior from an open-weight model. Claude models "stayed at 0%" across the same tested conditions.

Producing an abliterated version required roughly 2,200 GPU hours, or about $4,400, and pushed refusal rates from above 90% down to between 3% and 12% while preserving core capabilities. "Several developers released abliterated versions of GLM-5.3 to the public within days of the model's release," the authors write.

In a live test, GLM-5.3 chained several previously unknown vulnerabilities in a web browser's JavaScript engine into a working exploit "over the course of a day (and with limited human attention)." A separate run against a known Chrome flaw, CVE-2026-11645, took "20 minutes of human attention, plus 8 hours" of model work and cost $20.40.

Andrew Fasano, Marius Fleischer, Cole McFaul, Robert Xiao and Tripp Gallagher call the release "a meaningful step change in the cyber capabilities available to attackers," warning that GLM-5.3 "will likely give malicious actors access to capabilities that will allow them to find and exploit cyber vulnerabilities without meaningful restrictions." The post neither explains Zhipu's release reasoning nor cites a company response.

What others are reporting

Coverage cluster as of 24h after publish

  1. The Decoder Read →

    Raises regulatory-capture concern: Anthropic calling for government testing of GLM-5.3 successors may entrench incumbents behind rules that freeze out open-weight competitors.

    GLM-5.3 can build complete cyber exploits on its own, just like Mythos Preview. Unlike every other model with comparable skills, though, it shipped without effective safeguards.
  2. Tom's Hardware Read →

    Hardware-focused readership framing positions GLM-5.3 as a supply-chain risk for enterprises running open-weight models on local infrastructure, not just cloud API users.

  3. TokenPost Read →

    Foregrounds the NIST/CAISI September 17 independent assessment as the primary source, framing Anthropic's red-team report as corroboration rather than the originating claim.

    Simple techniques bypassed GLM-5.3's safeguards about 64% to 100% of the time.
  4. Startup Fortune Read →

    Connects the red-team findings to Anthropic's concurrent IPO filing, which cites catastrophic or existential AI risk as a material investor disclosure -- sharpening the commercial stakes.

    Attackers using simple jailbreak techniques got past GLM-5.3's safety filters between 64% and 100% of the time in simulated tests.

Shared on Bluesky by 6 AI experts (top 5 by trust)